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Abstract
We set up a model to study how ownership structure, corporate law and employment 
law interact to set the incentives that infl uence the decision by the large shareholder or 
manager effectively controlling the fi rm to divert resources from minority shareholders and 
employees. We suggest that agency problems between the controller and other investors 
and holdup problems between shareholders and employees are connected if the controller 
bears private costs of “expropriating” these groups. Corporate law and employment law 
may therefore somethimes be substitutes; employees may benefi t from better corporate 
law intended to protect minority shareholder, and vice versa. Our model has implications 
for the domestic and comparative study of corporate governance structure and addresses, 
among other things, the question whether large shareholders are better able to “bond” with 
employees than dispersed ones, or whether the separation of ownership facilitates long-
term relationships with labor.
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1 Introduction
The interaction between nance and labor has been studied with increasing
interest in recent years (Pagano & Volpin, 2008). One aspect of the debate is the
possibility of employees (or other stakeholders) making rm-specic investment
in human capital from which the rm will benet. However, stakeholders may
be deterred from such investment if they are not adequately rewarded for it
because managers or shareholders will expropriate their (quasi-)rents (Shleifer
& Summers, 1988). This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on this issue
by trying to identify the circumstances under which such holdup situations are
likely to occur by linking them to corporate ownership and governance structures
prevalent in di¤erent rms and di¤erent countries. We also analyze how holdup
issues with respect to workers may be connected to agency problems from which
shareholders su¤er. 1 In any case, even if one does not believe specic human
capital to be an important issue for corporate governance, our model may still
be of interest for the distributive issue of how rents produced by the corporation
are assigned to managers, large and small shareholders, and workers.
The bulk of the corporate governance literature is concerned with private
benets of control, which allows the controller of the rm to usurp part of the
corporate patrimony that minority investors would have expected to participate
in (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). It is part of the conventional wisdom in compar-
ative corporate governance that agency problems di¤er strongly between rms
with dispersed and concentrated ownership, the main issue being managerial
agency problems in the rst and agency problems resulting from the presence
of a large shareholder in the second case (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1997:758-761),
the e¤ect being that policymakers in di¤erent countries will have to look at
di¤erent issues depending on which kind of ownership predominates in a par-
ticular corporate governance system. Di¤erences in the rms interaction with
other stakeholders, such as workers, are a less well researched issue. From an
empirical point of view it is well known that in the OECD countries there is a
signicant negative cross-country correlation between workersprotection and
ownership dispersion (Belloc & Pagano, 2009). It is not clear whether there is
a causal relation between the two factors, or whether they constitute a set of
institutional complements. Roe (Roe, 2003) suggests that stronger employment
law and social democratic policies in general might increase the incentives to
concentrate ownership due to exacerbated managerial agency problems, while
other scholars have recently emphasized a possible (additional) opposite causal
relation with pro-labor laws as a reaction to the concentration of power and
corporate ownership (Gelter, 2009; Belloc & Pagano, 2009).
The latter direction of causality is based on assumptions that are not unan-
imously held in the comparative corporate governance literature.
1Our model does not build directly on the technical literature on holdup models. As
usually understood; we use the term holdup to refer to opportunism to the detriment of
workers in general. In some sense our model is more general than the holdup case; our model
applies to any situation in which some kind of contractual incompleteness allows for ex-post
expropriation of workers and shareholders.
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While some authors have suggested that large shareholders may be bet-
ter able to exploit non-shareholder constituencies (Charreaux & Desbrières,
2001:758; Jackson, 2005:116), another part of the literature hypothesizes that
large shareholders may be better able to commit to the rm in the long run,
thus assuring to stakeholders that specic investment can safely be made with-
out needing to fear ex-post expropriation of rents (e.g. Aguilera & Jackson,
2003:183; Woolcock, 1996:451). On the one hand, one could argue that this
proposition is counterintuitive, considering that shareholders presumably are the
nancial beneciary of holdup of stakeholders. Large, controlling shareholders
(or coalitions of large shareholders) who are able to inuence management, could
therefore both be in a good position and have strong incentives to expropri-
ateworkers. By contrast, the literature suggesting that this long-commitment
to employees is prevalent seems to presume that managers in dispersed owner-
ship systems are forced by market mechanisms, most of all by hostile takeovers,
to expropriate workers where shareholders can benet from it nancially (e.g.
Franks & Mayer, 1998:728-729). 2
In reality, this assumption often seems not to be justied. In recent years, le-
gal scholars have increasingly found that managers in the US, the paradigmatic
dispersed ownership system, are typically relatively insulated from shareholders
and often do not have strong incentives to pursue shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion. In particular, there is persuasive evidence that Delaware corporate law has
developed to o¤er managers highly e¤ective means to shield themselves against
hostile takeovers (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Scholars of comparative corporate law
point out that the US corporate governance system, taking both the law and
nancial structures into account, provides an unusual degree of insulation of
managers (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004:53-54).3 While this aspect of US cor-
porate governance often leads to considerable criticism (e.g. Bebchuk & Cohen,
2005), others have attempted to nd e¢ ciency explanations (Bainbridge, 2003;
Elhauge, 2005). On the basis of Rajan & Zingalescontribution to the theory
of the rm (Rajan & Zingales, 1998), Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have de-
veloped a team production theory of corporate law (Blair & Stout, 1999,Blair
& Stout, 2006), the core claim of which is that the insulation of managers from
shareholders is e¢ cient because it protects employees and other stakeholders
from holdup. Similarly, others have suggested that taking the rm public re-
duces the possibility of shareholder intervention, thus e¤ectively allowing man-
agers and/or employees some leeway to capture private benets if the rm is
successful (Burkart et al., 1997, Brealey et al., 2006:949). This kind of argument
has problems in rms or corporate governance systems characterized by concen-
trated ownership. In such systems, other mechanisms such as codetermination
or employment law may help to protect stakeholders from holdup (cf. Fauver
& Fuerst, 2006:679-680; Armour & Deakin, 2003:445-452). Thus, it has been
2This is the situation envisioned by the well-known contribution of Shleifer & Summers,
1988 regarding hostile takeovers in the US.
3 In fact, the situation seems to be very di¤erent in the UK, the second important dispersed
ownership system, where takeover law has provided an obligations for managers to stay neutral
in takeover contests since the late 1960s. See Armour & Skeel, 2007.
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suggested that pro-employee laws may be relatively more desirable in corporate
governance systems with concentrated ownership than in dispersed ones, and
in dispersed ownership systems with more vibrant markets for hostile takeovers
than in ones where managers can e¤ectively shield themselves (Gelter, 2009).4
The two views on the e¤ects of ownership structure on stakeholders seem
to be irreconcilable at rst glance, as two mutually exclusive phenomena (the
presence of large blockholders or ownership dispersion) are interpreted as the
solution for the problem of long-term commitment to stakeholders. Our paper
seeks to provide a reconciliation on the basis of an identication of the reasons
why the e¤ective controller of a rm (either a manager or a large share-
holder) may refrain from expropriating either shareholders or stakeholders, or
both. We argue that expropriating either shareholders or stakeholders comes at
a cost. Depending on the respective corporate and labor laws, some resources
must be invested in expropriation. Many of these costs are borne by the rm.
While the controller always can expect some nancial benet from expropria-
tion, we argue that sometimes she has to bear some additional (private) costs
of expropriation herself, which creates a countervailing incentive. On the basis
of these costs, whose real-life interpretation we discuss in some detail below, we
identify various prototypical structures of rms that depend on the nature
of the private costs borne by the controller. Thus, the extent to which share-
holders and/or employees are expropriatedwill depend (1) on the controllers
ownership share, (2) on the strength of the applicable protecting the respective
group, and (3) on the presence of private costs of expropriatingnot borne by
the rm, but the controller. Ultimately, whether blockholders or the managers
of a dispersed rm are more likely to engage in long-term bonding with employ-
ees will depend on their private cost of expropriation (although the controlling
shareholderslarger nancial stake certainly has an impact).
At the same time, our model shows how the expropriation of (minority)
shareholders and stakeholders are connected. In the presence of a positive cost
of expropriation, employees may benet from laws intended to protect share-
holders, and vice versa. Holdup gains from putting pressure on employees result
in higher ex post shareholder value (in the form of higher dividends or stock
price). This implies that the controllers incentive to be tough on employees
depends on the extent to which he has to share these gains with minority share-
holders. In other words, if legal protection against private benets of control is
strong, the incentive to engage in holdup of employees will be reduced, since the
controller will have to share a large proportion of holdup gains with minority
shareholders. Thus, corporate law and employment law may to some extent be
substitutes, and interests of investors and employees may sometimes be aligned,
which may explain the coalitionsbetween these two groups against managers
that some scholars have identied. By contrast, the e¤ects of increased labor
protection on minority shareholders depend on the circumstances.
4Legal systems often distinguish between (individual) employment law and (collective)
labor law. We use both terms interchangeably, as our model does not distinguish between
these two bodies of law.
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2 The model
2.1 General framework
Our model attempts to integrate specic investment by workers, holdup of work-
ers by the controller of the rm, and expropriation of minority investors by the
controller of the rm. The person in control of the rm, to which we refer to
as the manager, could, on one hand, represent senior management in a pub-
licly traded rm with dispersed ownership, or, on the other hand a single large
shareholder or a coalition of large blockholders e¤ectively controlling a rm
through concentrated ownership blocks. In the second case, it is assumed that
conicts of interests between a third-party manager and the controlling share-
holder are negligible; we consider only conicts of interests between controlling
and non-controlling shareholders as the relevant agency conict in this case. In
our model, the two archetypal types of ownership structure are distinguished by
the amount of shares held by the manager.
In either case, we assume that the manager needs outside shareholders to
nance the rm, and that employees make rm-specic investment (e.g. in
human capital). This allows the rm to operate and to produce a surplus.
The manager subsequently decides how to allocate the surplus between outside
investors, employees, and himself. Both investors and employees have a base-
line expectation about their share of the surplus. The manager can decide to
withhold part of the expected share from these groups, to which we refer as
minority expropriationand employee exploitationrespectively.5 However,
exploitation of either group is costly, and the manager is further constrained by
corporate law and employment law.
Wages are often understood to consist of a xed claim only. However, in
our model, the wage accorded to employees and their baseline expectation is
assumed to include rewards that are part of an implicit contract, such as e.g.
certain types of retirement benets, expectations regarding job security and ad-
vancement within the corporate hierarchy, and the safety of working conditions.
In the model we assume that the value of the production depends upon the
e¤ort put up by workers. We devise a two-stage game where the e¤ort of workers
is perfectly observable and the manager has the rst-mover advantage6 .
1. In the rst stage the manager chooses the level of worker and minority
expropriation.
2. In the second stage workers choose the optimal level of e¤ort (amount of
costly specic investment)
5By these terms we mean actions by managers and controlling shareholders reneging on
expectations by these two groups, thereby decreasing their utility, most of all the classical
agency and holdup problems familiar from contract theory.
6We try to capture in this way the asymmetric position of managers and workers. We are
somehow assuming that the managers are in a stronger position either because of the hierarchic
relation between managers and workers or because the manager has better information than
the workers.
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Since everything is observable and agents are rational, the level of expropri-
ation the manager will choose in the rst stage will depend upon the e¤ect he
expects on workerse¤ort in the second stage.
The value of the output produced by the rm will be x (e), where e is the
e¤ort of the workers, x0 > 0 and x00 < 0. Once the output is produced, the
manager can decide to put up some e¤ort to expropriate the workers (e.g. by
exploiting hold up situations).
The wage earned by the worker is a share ! of the output. w = !x (e).
The e¤ort made by the manager to exploit workers determines !, ! = $  
(1  pL)  (cL), where $ is the share of revenues used to pay workers if the
manager does not invest in workers exploitation, pL 2 [0; 1] is the degree of
protection accorded to workers by employment law. In our model, employment
law is understood to either prevent exploitation outright (e.g. by making it
hard or costly to make workers redundant), or by giving considerable bargaining
powers to workers and unions, such as mandatory codetermination, consultation
requirements, or the requirement to negotiate a costly social plan for redundant
employees. cL is the amount of resources spent to expropriate the workers and
0 > 0, 00 < 0, limcL!1 (cL) = $. Depending on the particular circumstances
of the case (explained below), this cost will be borne by the rm or by the
manager himself.
Once the wages have been paid, what remains are the prots:
 = (1  !)x (e)  cc   cL:
Prots have to be shared between the manager and minority sharehold-
ers. The manager can spend resources to expropriate minority shareholders.
The amount of dividends earned by minority shareholders is dm = f, where
f =
 
1  f   (1  pc)  (cc). f 2 [0; 1] is the share of capital7 owned by the
manager, pc 2 [0; 1] is the degree of protection accorded to minority sharehold-
ers by corporate law. The rules of corporate law we attempt to capture are
the ones usually described as shareholder protection in the literature, such
as the ones preventing or penalizing asset diversion or dilution of stock value
(see generally Djankov et al., 2008). cc is the amount of resources devoted to
minority shareholder exploitation. We also assume that the marginal return
from expropriation is decreasing8 : 0 > 0, 00 < 0, limcc!1 (cc) = 1.
Workerse¤ort For sake of simplicity, let us assume that x (e) := 2
p
e. In this
case the worker will choose the optimal amount of e¤ort in order to maximize
his own utility
e = argmaxu = w (e)  e
7We use the term capital with reference to the amount of cash ow rights in the hand of
the controller. The amount of cash ow right in the hand of a controlling shareholder may
be substantially di¤erent from his voting rights in the case of pyramids, cross-ownership and
dual class share structures; in some cases it may be possible to control the company with only
a small share in cash ow rights. See Bebchuk et al. (2000)
8Or, in other words, we are assuming that the marginal cost of expropriation is increasing.
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Thus
e (cL; pL) =
1
4
[$   (1  pL)  (cL)]2
x (cL; pL) =
1
2
[$   (1  pL)  (cL)]
This implies that both the e¤ort provided by the workers and the produc-
tivity of the rm are a¤ected by the degree of labor protection, but are not
a¤ected by the degree of minority protection. The reason why we have chosen
this formulation is mainly for sake of simplicity.
If this is the case, then the manager will choose the level of worker expropri-
ation according to the e¤ects he expects on the e¤ort provided by the workers.
Subsequent analysis Using this framework, we analyze the interaction be-
tween labor law and minority shareholder protection. In particular, we argue
that these two bodies of law interact so that
1. when the degree of shareholder protection changes (e.g. as the result of
a change of corporate law), the amount of worker exploitation is a¤ected
as well. Likewise, when the degree of workers protection is changed, the
amount expropriated from minority shareholder is also a¤ected.
2. the exact type of interaction between these two bodies of law is rm specic
and depends on the type of the governance structure.
3. a change in ownership concentration (mediated by labor and minority
protection) does not a¤ect the expropriation of workers in all rms. The
extent depends on the existence of private costs of expropriating workers.
Furthermore, our analysis shows the signicance of the size of the controlling
block on the expropriation of workers, and the importance of who bears the cost
of expropriation of either of the two weakgroups.
In the following sections, we distinguish various cases, each of which is in-
terpreted to represent specic types of rms. The cases are distinguished on
the basis of whether managers personally bear a cost of expropriating (minor-
ity) shareholders and/or employees. Within each section, we can distinguish
between rms where managers own only a small stake (dispersed ownership)
and rms where they own a large one (concentrated ownership) if the version
of the model lends itself to a real-life interpretation. In either case, a private
cost of expropriation that cannot be shifted to the rm protects both minority
shareholders and employees.
2.2 Type 1. Firms controlled by nancial investors
In the rst case, the cost of both expropriating shareholders and of exploit-
ing workers is borne by the rm and no private costs are paid directly by the
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manager. There is no private cost of expropriating either minority sharehold-
ers or labor. Typically, tunneling transactions out of the rm that will harm
small shareholders (both under dispersed and under concentrated ownership)
will require complex transactions, and the advice of skilled professionals (such
as lawyers or accountants) how to circumvent the law. Part of the resources
spent on tunneling will therefore not correspond to an advantage to the man-
ager, but simply be a deadweight loss. The same may apply with regard to the
expropriation of workers. Firing workers, or even just threatening them with re-
dundancy e.g. to obtain concession from a union, may result in transitory costs,
such as reassignment of tasks within the rm or transaction costs resulting from
negotiations. We assume that all of these costs are borne by the rm, i.e. the
manager has no personal cost. There is not even a non-pecuniary cost from
reduced reputation or from violations of social norms. Thus, the manager does
not care whether employees or shareholders su¤er because his personal wealth
is not a¤ected.
In cases of concentrated ownership, a plausible interpretation could be that
controlling shareholder is a nancial investor, such as a private equity investor,
who is only interested in prots. Since the fund does not care about the non-
monetary benet of control and has direct power over the manager, it can divert
company resources and use them to cover the costs of exploiting workers and
minority shareholders.
In a rm with dispersed ownership, managers would have no social norms re-
inforcing long-term interaction with workers, and no interest in empire-building.
The manager also does not have to fear any indirect repercussions from harming
shareholders.
Result 1 In the absence of private costs of expropriation, there only a partial
interrelation between the e¤ects of corporate law and employment law.
1. If minority shareholder protection increases, the share of minority div-
idends expropriated by the manager decreases, but the expropriation of
workers is una¤ected.
2. If labor protection increases, both the share of wages expropriated and
the share of minority dividend expropriated are a¤ected. The share of
wage expropriated decreases. The share of minority dividend expropriated
decreases if the labor share is large (! > 1=2) but grows if the labor share
is small (! < 1=2).
3. If the share of cash ow rights in the hands of the nancial investor
 
f

increases then the expropriation of workers is una¤ected but the degree of
minority expropriation decreases.
Proof. The maximization problem faced by the manager is
max
cc;cL
DL = (1  f)
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max
cc;cL
DL =

f + (1  pc)  (cc)

[(1 $ + (1  pL)  (cL))x (e)  cc   cL]
then the rst order conditions are
0 (cc) =
f + (1  pc)  (cc)
(1  pc) [(1  2x)x   cc   cL] (1)
0 (cL) =
4
(1  pL) (2x   1)
1) If pc increases, 0 must increase and  (cc)must shrink in order for equation
1 to hold true. Since 00 < 0; then  (cc) has to become smaller when 0 grows.
At the same time pc does not play any role in the rst order condition for ,
hence a change in pc does not a¤ect .
2) If pL grows, then both rst order conditions are a¤ected. A su¢ cient
condition that leads to an increase of 0 is the increase of pL. When 0 becomes
larger, it leads to a reduction of . On the contrary 0 becomes larger if and
only if $   (1  pL)  (cL) > 1=2.
3) Finally if f changes, only 0 is a¤ected: it has to become larger implying
a reduction of .
The e¤ects of an increase in labor protection on the expropriation of minority
crucially depend on the share of value added that is paid to workers. Intuitively,
an increase of labor protection and wages paid has a twofold e¤ect on rms
prots. On one side, an increase in wages leads to a direct reduction of prots.
On the other side, the same wage increase push workers to use a higher e¤ort that
increases the value of production and prots. The net e¤ects on prots depends
on the relative size of the two e¤ects. Since there is a decreasing marginal
productivity of e¤ort, when ! is large the e¤ort already provided by workers
is high and has a low marginal productivity. In this case a further increase in
! (due to an increase in labor protection) will usually overcome the connected
increase in the value added, hence prots decrease. If prots go down, the
incentive to expropriate the minority is reduced. By contrast, if ! is small the
e¤ort provided by workers is small as well and has a high marginal productivity.
In this case, the increase in the value added arising from an increase in labor
protection is likely to the overcome the additional wage expenses and lead to an
increase of prots. If prots grow, the incentive to expropriate minority prots
grows as well.
2.3 Type 2. Publicly traded family rms / managerial
rms
In this case a private cost of expropriating workers is borne by the manager.
As in the previous section, tunneling transactions will cost the rm because of
the deadweight loss resulted from the necessity to devise complex transactions
to conceal self-dealing as well as it will cost the exploitation of workers holdup.
These monetary costs reduce rms prots and, on the top of them, there is a
9
positive private cost of exploiting employees paid by the manager, but none of
expropriating minority shareholders.
Depending on the particular circumstances, there can be various institutional
explanations. Our model describes two distinct corporate archetypes. First, in
cases where f is high, the manager would be a controlling shareholder. More
specically, the rm could be controlled by an entrepreneurial family, which
is common even in very large rms in some Continental European countries
such as Italy. The literature on family rms suggests that families sometimes
enjoy non-pecuniary benets from control, such as national or regional prestige
(Burkart et al., 2003). Expropriating employees could harm that reputation
and make the social life of the familys members in the city or region dominated
by the company less pleasant. Furthermore, entrepreneurial families may enjoy
reigning over a large retinue of employees and therefore su¤er a cost from if it
lost some of them.9 By contrast, the controlling family may care little about
the well-being of outside shareholders, which is why there is no private cost of
expropriating these.
Second, where f is low, the model could apply to what is known as a Berle-
Means rm (Berle & Means, 1932), in which a publicly traded company is
e¤ectively controlled by managers holding only a small share of stocks. Blair and
Stout suggest that the (legal and factual) insulation of US boards of directors
(and managers) from shareholders may be e¢ cient because it prevents holdup,
thus facilitating specic investment by employees and stakeholder groups (Blair
& Stout, 1999; Blair & Stout, 2001:438-441). Under this theory, the reason
why employees trust managers is that these stand to lose something if they
expropriate employees. For example, there may be social norms that encourage
directors to maintain a reputation of trustworthiness. Furthermore, entrenched
managers may have a taste for empire-building, which will often coincide with
the interests of workers. In this interpretation of our model, cL would correspond
to managerscosts when they forgo these possibilities and violate social norms at
work in this context. In fact, there seems to be empirical evidence that at least
some workers and bondholders benet from entrenched management (Gokhale
et al., 1995; Chemla, 2005:379-380). Workers and managers are thus often seen
as natural allies against hostile takeovers (Pagano & Volpin, 2005).
In our model, the personal costs of expropriation are captured by the para-
meter , which is the ratio between the the private costs borne by the manager
and the costs of expropriating labor paid out the rms cash. The larger 
becomes, the bigger are the private costs in comparison to the direct cost of
expropriation.
Note that we are not yet taking the possibility of an e¤ective market for
takeovers into account at this point. In this subgroup of cases, managers (and
controlling shareholders) are fully entrenched, meaning that the desire to holdup
workers will largely depend on nancial incentives resulting from their ownership
share. Their non-pecuniary cost protects employees from holdup.
9Similarly, the rm could be controlled by a government entity. Political decision-maker
may be penalized by voters if they expropriate employees (resulting in the loss of jobs).
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Conceivably, the managers private costs from expropriating workers could
also be negative. This would mean that there are other factors balancing the
pro-employee bias described above in the Berle-Means rm, such as social norms
favoring a strong shareholder primacy norm.10
Furthermore, the existence of cost of expropriating workers also leads to
a shielding e¤ect for minority shareholders: The diminished holdup gains to
shareholders also decrease the incentive to expropriate this group.
Result 2 When the cost of expropriating labor is borne by managers, the shield-
ing e¤ects of corporate law and employment law are interrelated. Specically,
1. if the protection of minority shareholders increases, the share of minority
dividends expropriated (by the manager) decreases and the labor expropri-
ation is reduced as well.
2. if labor protection increases, the share of wages expropriated by the man-
ager decreases. The share of minority dividends expropriated decreases if
! > 1=2 and grows if ! < 1=2.
3. if f increases, the rate of minority expropriation decreases and the rate of
expropriation of workers increases.
4. if private costs of worker expropriation () increase, there is a rst order
reduction in workers expropriation. There is also a second order change
in the degree of minority expropriation: it decreases if ! > 1=2 and grows
if ! < 1=2.
Proof. The maximization problem faced by the manager is
max
cc;cL
DL = (1  f)   cL
max
cc;cL
DL =

f + (1  pc)  (cc)

[(1 $ + (1  pL)  (cL))x (e)  cc   cL]  cL
whose rst order conditions are
0 (cc) =
f + (1  pc)  (cc)
(1  pc) [(1  2x)x   cc   cL]
0 (cL) =
4
 
+ f + (1  pc)  (cc)

(1  pL) (2x   1)
 
f + (1  pc)  (cc)

1) If pc increases, 0 and 0 must increase. Since 00 < 0 and 00 < 0 then
 (cc) has to become smaller when 0 grows and  (cL) has to reduce since 0
grows, as well.
10 In the case of a (partly) government-owned entity, the cost may be negative because the
predominant voter preferences are against government stakes in the industry (which may often
have required subsidies from tax money in the past). In such a case, the government-appointed
manager may have incentives to cut labor costs.
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2) If pL grows, then both rst order conditions are a¤ected. A su¢ cient
condition that leads to an increase of 0 is the increase of pL. When 0 becomes
larger, it leads to a reduction of . On the contrary 0 becomes larger if and
only if $   (1  pL)  (cL) > 1=2.
3) If f changes, 0 has to become larger implying a reduction of  (cc), while
0 has to become smaller implying an increase of  (cL).
4) Since  appears only in the rst order condition for , an increase of 
will directly a¤ect , reducing it. A reduction in  will lead to an increase of !
and x such that 0 will reduce if ! < 1=2 and will increase if ! > 1=2.
An important result is that workers are not only protected by employment
law, but also by corporate law. The improvement in the protection of minority
shareholders makes it less attractive for the manager to expropriate employees
because he has to assign a larger proportion of potential holdup gains to the
outside shareholders.
On the ipside of the coin, the impact of labor protection on minority share-
holders is less clear: Overall, minority shareholders do not necessarily benet
from increased labor protection, since it is only their share that decreases: they
could still benet if holdup leads to an overall increase in shareholder value.
2.4 Type 3. Partnerships / publicly traded rms sub-
ject to a vibrant market for corporate control
In this subsection, there is a positive private cost of expropriating minority
shareholders, but none of expropriating employees. The rm directly pays the
entire cost of exploiting workers (with a reduction in prots). The manager, on
the other hand, has a cost of exploiting minority shareholders. In a concentrated
ownership rm, this model setup could be interpreted as a professional partner-
ship, where partners are in a long-term relationship and typically will care about
each other, therefore making expropriation of other partners costly.11 On the
other hand, shareholders may care little about employees (e.g. associates in
a law rm, where, according to the conventional wisdom, the turnover is very
high).
In the context of a publicly traded rm with dispersed ownership, the private
cost of expropriating shareholders could be the result of institutions aligning
the interests of managers with those of shareholders, such as a functioning sys-
tem of executive compensation, or an e¤ective market for corporate control.
Arguably, such factors are much less present in one paradigmatic dispersed
ownership system, the US, than it was often thought. In recent years, scholars
have suggested that compensation schemes actually found in practice are rather
a rent-seeking device for managers than a solution to agency problems, since
managers themselves have considerable inuence on the design of compensa-
tion packages (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Furthermore, Delaware corporate law
11The existence of a managerthat could exploit other partners may seem unlikely at rst
glance, since normally no individual partner will have a controlling stake. However, several
partner could form a coalition against another one to jointly control the rm.
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provides nearly perfect takeover defenses, namely the combination of staggered
boards and poison pills (Bebchuk et al., 2002). By contrast, takeover law in the
UK, the second important dispersed ownership system, is entirely di¤erent, as
the City Code on Mergers and Takeovers has provided an obligation for man-
agers to stay neutral in takeover contests since the late 1960s (Armour & Skeel,
2007). As a leading scholar of UK company law puts it, when facing a hostile
bid, the directors of the target are thrown back on their powers of persuasion
(Davies, 2008:987). The model could here represent a publicly traded British
rm, where the directors face a more signicant cost in the form of an increased
probability of a hostile takeover when they expropriate minority shareholders.12
The introduction of a private cost of exploiting minority shareholders is
shown by , which is the ratio between the private cost borne by the manager
alone and the one paid directly by the rm..
Result 3 When there is a private cost of expropriating shareholders, but not of
employees, there is a partial interrelation between the e¤ects of the two bodies
of law.
1. If minority shareholder protection increases, then the share of minority
dividends expropriated by the manager decreases, but the expropriation of
labor is una¤ected.
2. On the contrary, if labor protection increases both the share of wages ex-
propriated and the share of minority dividends expropriated are a¤ected.
Labor expropriation is reduced while the e¤ects on minority expropriation
depend on the value of !. Its share grows if and only if ! < 1=2, and
decreases otherwise.
3. If f increases, the rate of expropriation of workers is una¤ected, but the
rate of minority expropriation becomes smaller.
4. If private losses of shareholders expropriation () increase, there is a re-
duction in minority expropriation.
Proof. The maximization problem faced by the manager is
max
cc;cL
DL = (1  f)   cc
max
cc;cL
DL =

f + (1  pc)  (cc)

[(1 $ + (1  pL)  (cL))x (e)  cc   cL]  cc
0 (cc) =
 + f + (1  pc)  (cc)
(1  pc) [(1  2x)x   cc   cL]
0 (cL) =
4
(1  pL) (2x   1)
12Social norms may also play a role here. Bainbridge (Bainbridge, 2003:582) claims that
it is largely a social norm of shareholder primacy (and not the market for corporate control)
that keeps US directors aligned with shareholder interests.
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1) If pc increases, 0 must increase. Since 00 < 0; then  (cc) has to become
smaller when 0 grows. At the same time pc does not play any role in the rst
order condition for , hence a change in pc does not a¤ect .
2) If pL grows, then both rst order conditions are a¤ected. A su¢ cient
condition that leads to an increase of 0 is the increase of pL. When 0 becomes
larger, it leads to a reduction of . However, 0 becomes larger if and only if
$   (1  pL)  (cL) > 1=2.
3) If f changes, 0 has to become larger implying a reduction of  (cc), while
0 is not a¤ected.
4) Since  appears only in the rst order condition for , an increase of 
will directly a¤ect , reducing it. A reduction in  does not a¤ect  since it does
not a¤ect x.
2.5 Type 4. Closely-held family rms / publicly traded
rms subject to a vibrant market for corporate control
In this case, there is a private cost of expropriating either minority shareholders
or labor, i.e. the manager pays private costs both of exploiting workers and
minority shareholders.
In the concentrated ownership situation, the most intuitive interpretation
would seem to be a closely-held family rm. Minority shareholders who may
be exploited may be family members or friends with a long-standing social
relationship to the manager. The managers utility function would therefore also
be altruistic with respect to this group. Furthermore, as a leading member of the
entrepreneurial family, he also cares about the well-being of long-term employees
he closely interacts with on a day-to-day basis, and draws non-pecuniary benets
from the familys social standing in the town where the company is located.
The dispersed ownership case of this version of the model resembles that of
the previous section, with the exception of the additional private cost of ex-
ploiting workers. The manager may still be subject to a vibrant market for
corporate control (represented by the private cost of expropriating sharehold-
ers), but at the same time care about the well-being of workers, e.g. because
of countervailing social norms. The exact e¤ects will depend on the relative
magnitude of these e¤ects.
Conceivably, the costs of exploiting either shareholders or workers could also
be negative. For example, the cost of exploiting minority shareholders could
be negative because the shareholder-manager tunneling assets out of the rm
could have an advantage the rm does not have, e.g. resulting from synergy
e¤ects that increase the value of assets when used outside the rm. In the case
of a negative cost of exploiting employees, he would reap an additional benet
when they expropriate employees, e.g. because the market for corporate control
creates a particularly high probability of being ousted by a hostile bidder
Result 4 When the manager faces both private cost of expropriating minority
and labor, then there is an interrelation between the e¤ects of the two bodies of
law. Specically,
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1. if minority shareholders protection increases, both the share of wages ex-
propriated by the manager and the share of minority dividends expropri-
ated (by the manager) decrease;
2. if labor protection increases, the share of wages expropriated by the man-
ager decreases, while the e¤ect on minority expropriation depends on the
value of !. Minority expropriation decreases if and only if ! < 1=2. It
grows in the opposite case;
3. if f increases, the rate of minority expropriation decreases and the rate of
workers expropriation increases.
4. if private costs of worker expropriation () increase, there is a rst order
reduction in expropriation of workers and a second order change in share-
holder expropriation: it increases if ! < 1=2 and decreases otherwise.
5. if private costs of shareholders expropriation () increase, there is a rst
order reduction in minority expropriation and a second order reduction in
labor expropriation;
Proof. The maximization problem faced by the manager is
max
cc;cL
DL = (1  f)   cc   cL
max
cc;cL
DL =

f + (1  pc)  (cc)

[(1 $ + (1  pL)  (cL))x (e)  cc   cL] +
  cc   cL
0 (cc) =
 + f + (1  pc)  (cc)
(1  pc) [(1  2x)x   cc   cL]
0 (cL) =
4
 
+ f + (1  pc)  (cc)

(1  pL) (2x   1)
 
f + (1  pc)  (cc)

1) If pc increases, 0 and 0 must increase. Since 00 < 0 and 00 < 0 then
 (cc) has to become smaller when 0 grows and  (cL) has to reduce since 0
grows, as well.
2) If pL grows, then both rst order conditions are a¤ected. A su¢ cient
condition that leads to an increase of 0 is the increase of pL. When 0 becomes
larger, it leads to a reduction of . On the contrary, 0 becomes larger if and
only if $   (1  pL)  (cL) > 1=2, since a reduction of  increases wages and
lead to an increase of x.
3) If f changes, 0 has to become larger implying a reduction of  (cc), while
0 has to become smaller implying an increase of  (cL).
4) Since  appears only in the rst order condition for , an increase of 
will directly a¤ect , reducing it. A reduction in  will lead to an increase of !
and x such that 0 will decrease if ! < 1=2 and will increase if ! > 1=2.
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5) Since  appears only in the rst order condition for , an increase of 
will directly a¤ect , reducing it. A reduction in  does not a¤ect  since it has
no e¤ect on the size of x.
3 Comparative observations
As we have seen, the e¤ects of changes in shareholder protection, labor protec-
tion, and concentration of ownership depend on the structure of the rm and
the respective private costs of expropriation. The following table summarize
some of the results.
H ig h e r m in o r i ty
p r o t e c t io n
H ig h e r la b o r p r o t e c t io n
H ig h e r ow n e r s h ip
c o n c e n t r a t io n
T y p e 1
n o p r iva t e c o s t
low e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
1 . am b ig u o u s ch a n g e
in m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . l ow e r la b o r e x p r .
l ow e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
T y p e 2
p r iva t e c o s t s
o f e x p r . l a b o r
1 . l ow e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . l ow e r la b o r e x p r .
1 . am b ig u o u s ch a n g e
in m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . l ow e r la b o r e x p r .
1 . l ow e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . h ig h e r la b o r e x p r .
T y p e 3
p r iva t e c o s t s o f
m in o r i ty e x p r .
l ow e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
1 . am b ig u o u s ch a n g e
in m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . l ow e r la b o r e x p r .
l ow e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
T y p e 4
p r iva t e c o s t s
o f b o t h e x p r .
1 . l ow e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . l ow e r la b o r e x p r .
1 . am b ig u o u s ch a n g e
in m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . l ow e r la b o r e x p r .
1 . l ow e r m in o r i ty e x p r .
2 . h ig h e r la b o r e x p r .
The rst result of our model is that changes in the level of labor and mi-
nority protection may a¤ect also players di¤erent from the ones that the law is
supposed to target. A change in minority protection may a¤ect the behavior of
the manager in respect of the workers, and vice-versa a change in the level of
labor protection may a¤ect the degree of minority shareholder expropriation in
a signicant way. This is one of the reason why we argue that policy making
in the two bodies of law should be coordinated in order to not give the wrong
incentives to managers.
Countries with strong shareholder protection tend to have weak protection
of labor, and vice versa (Roe, 2002:263-264;La Porta et al., 2008:311;Belloc
& Pagano, 2009). To a certain extent, our model conrms that shareholder
protection and labor protection may sometimes serve as substitutes: as long as
there is a private cost of exploiting workers, they will benet from either. The
reason why they benet from minority protection is that the manager would
have to share a larger proportion of holdup gains (and out of cash box cost
of expropriation) with minority shareholders. His inability to reap all of these
gains reduces his incentive to harm workers given his unchanged private cost.
As said, this result holds only where the is a positive cost of expropriating labor,
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as in the case of a controlling family or insulated managers that identify with
employees e.g. because of social norms. These might be the circumstances,
where, according to some scholarsclaims, investors and employees occasionally
engage in political coalitions against management (Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005:65-
67).
While labor protection naturally improves the position of labor, its e¤ects
for investors are mixed: Depending on the circumstances, they may benet from
it, or sustain harm. When either is likely to occur depends on the baseline ex-
pectations of labor about the distribution of rents produced by the company.
If these are low, the marginal benet of increasing labor protection for prots
is high, which also increases the incentive of the controller to expropriate mi-
nority shareholders. Particularly when minority protection is low, controlling
shareholders (managers) might have a joint interest in increasing labor protec-
tion, to the detriment of minority investors. What will happen over time will
of course depend on political processes and on how employeesbaseline expec-
tation about their share in corporate rents is formed. Assuming, for example,
a continuous increase in labor protection (due to joint lobbying by controlling
shareholders and labor unions) that is accompanied by a concurrent (or even
stronger) increase in employees expectations, a corporate governance system
will eventually reach a point where the marginal e¤ects of labor protection on
prots are negative, in which managers will rather side with minority sharehold-
ers against labor and lobby for the reduction of labor protection. This may be
one reason for increasing e¤orts to reduce labor protection in Europe since the
1990s after decades during which labor rights were strengthened.
Most importantly for the point originally motivating the paper, the model
also illustrates that a change in the ownership that leads to a higher (lower)
concentration is associated with an augmented (reduced) degree of expropriation
of workers only when there is a private cost of expropriating workers. If the
private cost of expropriating labor does not exist the owner will choose the same
degree of workersexpropriation regardless of his share in the company. The
private cost inhibits expropriation because of its countervailing incentive. In the
case of a larger ownership share, the manager has a greater nancial incentive
to exploit workers, which is why the private cost factor is more likely overcome.
By contrast, if ownership concentration increases, the degree of exploitation of
minority shareholders always decreases. The simple intuitive explanation is that
the amount that can be gained decreases with the minoritys ownership share,
so that the benets are no longer made up by the cost (irrespective of whether
they are borne by the rm or the manager).
For the question whether controlling shareholders or independent man-
agers are better able to bond with stakeholders and incentivize them to make
specic investment, the answer is (trivially) that in principles it is managers,
since they have no nancial gain from creating hold up situations that harm
stakeholders. However, there are many factors that complicate the issue, which
we have interpreted as private costs of expropriation that shield workers from
holdup (such as social norms or idiosyncratic preferences of controlling families).
The shielding e¤ect may be turned into its opposite if managers are particularly
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attuned to shareholder interests for institutional reasons.
4 Conclusion
Our paper has attempted to elucidate factors that may eliminate incentives for
controlling shareholders and managers to engage in self-dealing behavior to the
detriment of minority shareholders and in taking holdup and other opportunities
to exploit stakeholders, particularly labor. In particular, the previous literature
has often assumed that either managers of Berle-Means rms or large block-
holders are better able to provide credible commitment that allows stakeholders
to make rm-specic investment. Large ownership stakes may of course create
an incentive to exploit labor, since the nancial benet from it is comparatively
large. However, the most important factor for both managers or blockholders
is private costs of expropriation. For example, the CEO of a managerial rm
may enjoy empire-building or social prestige from controlling a large number of
employees, which will create a disincentive against holding up labor. Similarly,
a blockholding family may enjoy social prestige within the local community,
as a result of which they will refrain from exploiting labors rm-specic in-
vestment. For analytical purposes, we have also extended the concept of costs
of expropriation to the exploitation of minority shareholders through private
benets of control. For example, in a family rm, the controlling shareholder
member may be reluctant to expropriate his family members because he fears
social repercussions.
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